SS and Police Leader Lublin, HOFLE, Sturmbannfuhrer the message to Eichmann was only partially intercepted and decoded by British Intelligence. The second message to Heim is much more complete. Again, this message was only partially intercepted, as can be seen from a gap in the transcription. There is no indication that British intelligence analysts understood the meaning or significance of these two messages ' Unfortunately, no similar decode about Einsatz Reinhardt operations is to be found within the material declassified to date. We do not wish to pursue here a discussion of the provenance, reliability, and distribution of the German Police Decodes other than to say British Intelligence regarded die decodes as exceptional intelligence gathering, the secrets of which they maintained for more than fifty years Leader Lublin identified Hofle as a "Section Head for Jewish Affairs -Special Action Reinhardt" (Referent fur Judenangelegenheiten-Sonderaktion Reinhardt)* Hofle was in charge of almost all relevant activities concerning the murder of the Jews in the General Government: supervising construction work at the extermination camps, presenting them to visitors like Eichmann, preparatory work of "cleansing" the ghettos, in particular coordination of activities with the local civil administration, "cleansing" of the ghettos by Security and Order Police units reinforced by Globocnik's police auxillianes from the Trawniki training camp, dispatch of trains to the chosen extermination camps, utilization of the properties left by the Jews to be murdered. The addressee of the radio telegram was SS Lieutenant Colonel Franz Heim, 5 from September 1941 deputy of the Commander of die Security Police and the SD for the General Government (Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, SS Oberfiihrer Eberhard Schdngarth). The subject of the radio telegram reads "fortnighdy report Einsatz REINHART [sic] " The same idiosyncratic spelling Einsatz Reinhart appears in both the pnnted and the typewritten office letterheads of Hbfle s section in Globocnik's staff. 6 Whether it reflects Hbfle's inability to spell is not clear, though the latter is well documented. 7 The reference line of the radio message indicates that Hbfle was answering a request from Heim in Cracow. As no date is given, the latter may have been sent the same day, January 11, 1943. Hbfle s radio telegram provides us not only with a sum total of the victims of Einsatz Reinhardt in 1942 but for the first time also with precise knowledge of the distribution by extermination camp. The Hbfle telegram does not give us the full names of the extermination camps, but only the letters L, B, S, and T. The letters B, S, and T certainly stand for Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka s Until recently it has been accepted by historians that only these three extermination camps belonged to Globocnik's "Einsatz Reinhardt" Now we have a fourth camp-L-obviously the Concentration Camp hublin, commonly known as Majdanek, hsted by Hbfle ahead of the other three camps 9 Belzec, Sobibor, and Treblinka were extermination camps, so it is reasonable to assume that the numbers given for "h" are numbers of Jews murdered also it would not make sense to give the numbers Jailed for three camps and make Lublin an exception Who were the 24,733 Jewish victims sent to "L," of whom more than half arrived and were murdered during the last fourteen days of 1942? Were they prisoners of the concentration camp killed in the gas chambers after selections there? It is rather unlikely that such large-scale selections inside the concentration camp, other murders by gassings, or transports of bodies to huge mass graves would have escaped the notice of surviving prisoners. Many of the latter were able to give testimonies after the war, in particular at the Diisseldorf Majdanek trial. As far as can be ascertained, no mass killing exceeding 12,000 Jewish prisoners there before 1943 is mentioned in the rather scarce literature on Majdanek. the victims must have come from somewhere else. The only area whence large transports could have arrived at this time was the Bialystok General District A number of transports were directed indeed from Bialystok to Auschwitz and Treblinka, but some might have reached Lublin too Another possible source, after the dissolution of almost all ghettos, was the remaining small labor camps in the General Government In mid-November 1942 the communist underground army Guardia Ludowa attacked the water administration camp (Wassenvirtschaftslager) Janiszow in Krasmk district, where 900 Jewish prisoners were employed at draining marshes. Himmler immediately issued an order to the Higher SS and Police Leader Friedrich-Wilhelm Kriiger in Cracow to have all smaller, weakly-guarded camps liquidated.
10 Of forty-two such camps in the Lublin region thirty-eight were dissolved before the end of 1942." Most of these had had a capacity of 400 to 600 prisoners in 1941, l2 with a few ranging up to 1,500. But it is doubtful whether this capacity was still employed at the end of 1942. However, we can assume that several thousand Jewish prisoners from the water administration camps fell victim to Himmler s order. In addition, a considerable number of other forced labor camps were also dissolved There were dozens of diem in the districts of Lublin and Radom, which were closer to Concentration Camp Lublin than to Sobibor or Treblinka (Belzec had already been closed) So die huge numbers of victims at Concentration Camp Lublin in a short period of time may have come from unknown transports from the Bialystok General District or, more Likely, from small forced labor camps. Globocnik must have been responsible for sending these unknown Jewish victims to the gas chambers of Majdanek, because, according to Hofle's telegram, he counted them as Einsatz Reinhardt victims. Taking into consideration that slightly more than half of these Lublin victims were killed during the last fourteen days of the year, the Concentration Camp Lublin might have served Globocnik and his men as an additional killing site, which they might have taken over before the killings at Belzec were stopped Globocnik halted the deportations of Jews from the ghettos in the district of Lublin on November 9, 1942, the day when about 3,000 Jewish men, women, and children from Majdan Tatarski camp were sent to die Concentration Camp Lublin. From the beginning of November until the closing of Belzec a month later only Galician Jews were still being gassed there. 13 Unfortunately, reliable information is unavailable, so further research is needed. M Details on this deportation emerge from die reports of survivors ^ It has to be stated diat the number 515 accords well with the sources. It should be noted that the figures in Hofle's message include only die numbers of murders in the extermination camps. Three of them were devoted extermination camps, where those unable to walk were shot and the huge majority gassed. 24 Lublin, however, was a regular concentration camp; from October 1942 three gas chambers were used to murder prisoners after selections of diose deemed unable to work. The number culled dunng selections in Majdanek from October onwards is known-their sum is much lower than the figures given in Hofle's radio telegram. 25 As the document indicates, the murder of Jews transported to Lublin without being registered at the concentration camp became an integral part of Einsatz Rewhardt from an unspecified date onward Further research, one hopes, will hopefully permit more precise information.
In the main, the separate figures for the Reinhardt camps provided by Hofle's radio telegram can be confirmed by published research. The document is a reliable source and will have to be considered in all future research concerning the numbers of murdered Jews in the General Government An unknown number of Jews, perhaps tens of thousands, were shot during the ghetto 'cleansings' or in the forests.
28 Undoubtedly their number is not included in these statistics The Reichsfiihrer-SS has received your statistical report on the "Final Solution of the European Jewish Problem". He does not wish the words "special treatment of Jews"
A Note on Terminology and Spellings
[Sonderbehandlung] to be used at all On page 9, point 4 the text must read as follows "Transportation of Jews from the Eastern Provinces to the Russian East Number of those passed through the camps in the General Government, through the camps in Warthegau "A different formulation must not appear 58 It should be noted diat die seemingly harmless euphemism "passed through the camps in the General Government" (durchgeschleust durch die Lager im Generalgouvernement) already earned a sinister meaning for insiders in 1942/43. The phrase denves from the common tenn "transit camps" (Durchgangslager In Korherr's shortened report the "camps in the General Government" are no longer mentioned Only the number 1,274,166 appears in the table "Emigration, Excess Mortality, and Evacuation," and in the columns "Evacuation" and "General Gov. (with Lemberg)." The "camps in the Warthegau," that is Chelmno, are no longer menboned and no numbers are given. Korherr's number of Jewish victims with reference to the "camps in the General Government" exactly matches the total in Hofle's radio telegram. It is worth noting that only five minutes before, at lOOOh, the same broadcaster, with the German police call sign "OMQ," identified by British Intelligence as located in Lublin, 85 had sent another radio telegram, also marked "State Secret," this time to Eichmann in Berlin It is reasonable to assume that both State Secret radio telegrams, transmitted by the same sender, were in fact identical or almost identical In a postwar interview with Willem Sassen in Argentina Eichmann claimed that an unnamed Regierungsrat, after completing his statistical report in the IV B 4 office, handed over the total material collected by him:
Obviously there was also information on how many Jews Globocnik had killed in the General Government Where the Regierungsrat [Korherr] received it from, I do not know.
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The documented chronological sequence tells another story first, Eichmann completed his Tatigkeits-und Lagebericht 1942, which Himmler received and rejected. Then he very likely received the numbers concerning the General Government from Hofle on January 11. Korherr could make use of these same numbers when he began work at Eichmann's office a week later On completion, the Korherr Report was handed over to Himmler and also to Eichmann In Argentina Eichmann either suffered a lapse of memory or he lied, putting intermediaries between die information about mass extermination and himself. Eichmann probably learned the correct numbers of murdered Jews in the General Government directly dirough Hofle's radio message The authors have not been able to determine whether non-Polish Jews from Germany, Austria, the Protectorate, and Slovakia were included in Hofle's and Korherr's figure. Korherr's statistics are apparendy too ambiguous for a decision. On the one hand, his number for Jews deported to Theresienstadt is more than 21,000 smaller dian the actual number. 67 This evident reduction in numbers suggests that at least some of the deportees from Theresienstadt to die Lubhn district and Warsaw ghetto are probably included in die Hofle-Korherr number of 1,274,166 victims On die other hand, Korherr's number of Jews deported from Slovakia comes near to the sum total of Jews actually deported. 68 At the end of 1942 at least 30,000 to 35,000 of diese Slovak Jews had already been murdered in die Reinhardt camps. It follows that diey cannot be included in die Hofle-Korherr number, otherwise it would be statistical double-counting. Further research is required to resolve this contradiction. The Police Decodes are something of a misnomer, since they are not restricted to German Police radio messages, but cover radio transmissions from the whole range of SS and Police organizations, including the Waffen-SS They also cover mundane subjects such as supplies of food and ammunition or personnel transfers between units, but also occasionally matters of serious historical importance The latter is the case here It should be noted that the decoded material was not always appreciated by British Intelligence, though transmitted on January 11, 1943, the messages were not decrypted and distributed unbl January 
